The Chief Justice issued his annual report to congress on the federal judiciary and once again asked for a raise in the salaries of federal judges. The Chief Justice pointed out that federal judges were the only federal employees who didn’t get a Cost-of-living adjustment for 2009. He praised the way the courts have scaled back their spending but pointed out that their wages are dropping against inflation year after year.

You can see the whole report here.

In each of the last few years, the Court has released 2-4 cases over the first two days of arguments in the new year. For this term, those days are January 12 and January 13. Look out for cases to come down then and again the week later.

(Nearly) every majority opinion features a short introduction before it jumps into the standard I, II, III, IV, etc structure. Some Justices simply introduce the facts very briefly (Scalia), while others discuss the procedural history (Thomas), and others discuss the underlying issue in the case (Souter.) I took a look at all of the cases from OT 2007 to see if any Justices have a particular stylistic preference.

I defined a ‘Subject Matter’ introduction as one in which the author wrote only about the facts of the case and did not mention the court below. See Justice Alito’s introduction in Gomez-Perez v. Potter:

The question before us is whether a federal employee who is a victim of retaliation due to the filing of a complaint of age discrimination may assert a claim under the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as added, 88 Stat. 74, and amended, 29 U. S. C. §633a(a) (2000 ed., Supp. V). We hold that such a claim is authorized.

I defined a ‘Procedural’ introduction as one that included even a brief mention of the ruling below. The main distinction between ‘Subject Matter’ and ‘Procedural’ introductions is that in the latter, the author had to phrase the decision of the Court as a play off of the Court below. For example, in Richlin v. Chertoff, Justice Alito wrote this ‘Procedural Decision’ as the introduction:

The question presented in this case is whether the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U. S. C. §504(a)(l) (2006 ed.) and 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.), allows a prevailing party in a case brought by or against the Government to recover fees for paralegal services at the market rate for such services or only at their cost to the party’s attorney. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit limited recovery to the attorney’s cost. 472 F. 3d 1370 (2006). We reverse.

Finally, I defined a ‘Tease Facts’ introduction as one in which the author only mentioned (usually very briefly) the facts of the case and omitted any mention of the Court’s ultimate conclusion. Here is Justice Alito’s introduction in Davis v. Federal Election Committee which I categorized as a ‘Tease Facts’ decision:

In this appeal, we consider the constitutionality of federal election law provisions that, under certain circumstances, impose different campaign contribution limits on candidates competing for the same congressional seat.

As for length, I defined a ‘Short’ introduction simply as one limited to one paragraph. A ‘Long’ introduction was two paragraphs or longer in length.

An interesting argument could be made for each style. The data suggests that some Justices have a opinion on the matter and that their introductions isn’t simply a function of upon which clerk writes the opinion or the idiosyncrasies of the case in question. Four Justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, Thomas) used the same style in each of their opinions and two others (Ginsburg, Alito) made only one exception to their own self-imposed rule.

The ‘Subject Matter’ approach is the most straightforward and easily understood by lay-people reading opinions. A Justice that uses this approach with only a short introduction might be more inclined to decide a case on the fundamental issues at hand. A Justice who uses the ‘Procedural’ approach with a long introduction might be setting up his arguments aimed at technical issues separated from the politically divisive roots of a case. In the end though, there isn’t enough data here to reach any conclusions about why certain Justices prefer certain methods.

Justice Kennedy issued two opinions that defied the criteria I had set up for the three types of introductions that his peers used. In Federal Express v. Holowecki, Justice Kennedy presented some of the facts leading up the case then offered advice to any practitioners or judges who might use this opinion in the future, “[w]hile there may be areas of common definition, employees and their counsel must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.” The phrase itself is not uncommon, but the fact that it was placed in the introduction is unorthodox.

The other curveball thrown by Justice Kennedy was in Gonzalez v. US, where Justice Kennedy did not structure his opinion with an introduction and subsequent sections, and, without sections, I had to use my judgement to decide how far the introductory part of the opinion extends. Luckily for me, the opinion features a decidedly introduction-like presentation of the question at hand before it jumps into what is normally a Section I discussion of the complete history. I’m not sure why Justice Kennedy (or one of his clerks) decided not to use the normal structure. The 8-1 decision (Thomas dissenting) weighed in slightly-underweight at 12-pages and otherwise features the standard components of a majority decision. The average majority opinion from OT 2007 was 19.16 slip pages but an opinion of only 12-pages doesn’t stand out as an aberration. 14 cases from the last term were 12-pages or shorter and all of them except Gonzalez were broken up into sections.

Justices Breyer and Souter both used only ‘Subject Matter’ introductions in their opinions. Even though the cases were written by different clerks, his preference shown through either from their research into his past opinions or from his corrections of the ones they gave him. Justice Stevens, who writes his own opinions, used all three types of opinions in both long and short form.

Justice Scalia’s introductions were always instantly identifiable. In each case, he used the ‘Tease Facts’ approach and his introduction was only a sentences or two long. Take a look at his introduction to DC v. Heller, shown in its entirety:

We consider whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution.

All of the Justices except Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg preferred to use short introductions (those limited to one paragraph). The Chief Justice was split evenly 4-4 and Justice Ginsburg preferred lengthy introductions in six of her eight opinions. Four Justices refused to use long introductions at all (Breyer, Scalia, Souter, Thomas) and Justice Alito used them only once (Allison Engine Co. v. US.)

In a sign of things to come, Justice Roberts has already employed the ‘Procedural’ route this term in Winter v. NRDC when he declared “[t]he Court of Appeals was wrong, and its decision is reversed. ” In Altria Group v. Good, Justice Stevens used a ‘Procedural’ introduction as well. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, a case decided in a Per curiam decision, was written using the ‘Procedural’ style and was authored by the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer or Justice Alito. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented from that opinion.

The use footnotes has been a topic of quiet conversation around the judiciary for some time now. One group of Judges and practitioners (and an even larger percentage of students) find them to be burdensome and often unnecessary. Others think they serve as useful guides and make opinions more readable. Footnotes largely come in two varieties: citations and explanations. Citation footnotes simply cite a source that was referenced in the main text of a document and are rarely employed by the Court. The Supreme Court’s tradition of using in-text citations has, in my opinion, made opinions more difficult to read. Explanatory citations, on the other hand, provide insight into a Justices thought process or certain calculations that are surplus to understanding of the decision at hand.

Footnotes have, occasionally, caused quite a bit of controversy. In Microsoft v. AT&T (2007), Justice Ginsburg wrote a majority opinion for the court except for one footnote. The judgement line read as such:

Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 14. Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joined that opinion in full. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring as to all but footnote 14, in which Thomas and Breyer, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Roberts, C. J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

The footnote in question:

¹⁴In a footnote, Microsoft suggests that even a disk shipped from the United States, and used to install Windows directly on a foreign computer, would not give rise to liability under §271(f) if the disk were removed after installation. See Brief for Petitioner 37, n. 11; cf. post, at 2–4 (ALITO, J., concurring). We need not and do not reach that issue here.

It seems odd that Justice Ginsburg would only discuss the topic in a footnote if it was divisive enough to cause Justices to change their vote. The most famous footnote from a Supreme Court opinion is ‘Footnote 4′ from the majority opinion in US v. Carolene Products (1938). In it, Justice Stone famously hinted towards the possibility of heightened levels of scrutiny “when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.”

Analysis of the modern court’s use of footnotes is difficult because most Justices do not write their own opinions. Justice Stevens is the only Justice known to write his first drafts with any frequency and he has long stated that footnotes are useful because they provide the user with ‘optional reading.’ In his majority opinion in Altria, Justice Stevens employed 14 footnotes.

I took a look at the majority and plurality opinions from OT 07 to see how frequently each Justices uses footnotes. I looked only at majority and plurality opinions because they follow the most consistent structure and length. Concurring and dissenting opinions serve different purposes and are more difficult to compare amongst one another and with other types of opinions. I also calculated the number of footnotes per page and the page count refers to Slip Pages.

I’ve summarized all of that into a more succinct table:

Remember that all of the Justices, except for Stevens, have their law clerks write the first draft of each opinion. With that in mind, however, I was surprised to see that Justices Kennedy and Breyer didn’t use any footnotes at all. Overall though, it seems like footnotes are a stylistic thing more than a substantive disagreement. Justices who use them tend to use them frequently and Justices who aren’t fond of them don’t use them much at all. It also doesn’t really matter which clerk writes the opinion because nearly Every Justice who uses footnotes uses them in almost ever case.

I also crunched the numbers on the average number of footnotes in opinions based on the votes in the majority. I excluded opinions written by Justices Kennedy and Breyer. Note: These numbers do not represent opinions with irregular voting blocs (ie. 5-3, 5-2, 7-1, etc)

Odd. Statistically speaking, 8-1 opinions featured the highest number of footnotes. That is likely just a result of Justice Souter writing with disproportionate frequency in 8-1 opinions this year (2 out of 5.)

Cases with the most footnotes:

Heller 5-4 Scalia 29 64 0.45
Exxon 8-0 Souter 28 42 0.67
Danforth 7-2 Stevens 24 27 0.89
New Jersey 6-2 Ginsburg 22 23 0.96
Crawford 6-3 Stevens 21 21 1.00
Dept. of Rev. 7-2 Souter 21 28 0.75
Rothgery 8-1 Souter 17 20 0.85
Kimbrough 7-2 Ginsburg 15 23 0.65
Medellin 6-3 Roberts 14 37 0.38
Meacham 8-0 Souter 14 17 0.82

These represent an interesting cross section of the Court’s cases. Of course, none of the tight 5-4 decisions issued by Justice Kennedy are featured here, but Justice Scalia’s landmark opinion in Heller leads the list. Oral arguments in Danforth lead to an unusually heated debate between the justices, literally. Medellin produced an unusual decision from the Court in which the conservative majority struck against the President and ruled that ICC judgements were not binding on state courts. Two of the other major cases decided by the Court, Kennedy (Juvenille Death Penalty) and Boumediene (Detainee habeus claims), were written by Justice Kennedy and therefore had no footnotes.

On Monday, in response to a complaint from the United States Department of Justice alleging that Governor Milorad “Rod” Blagojevich had solicited bribes and engaged in a massive conspiracy to commit fraud, the Illinois House voted 113-0 to begin impeachment proceedings. Blagojevich has not yet been indicted.

On December 10th, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid decided to celebrate Blagojevich’s 52nd birthday by drafting a letter soliciting his resignation. The letter, which was subsequently co-signed by the entire Democratic caucus, includes this warning:

Please understand that should you decide to ignore the request of the Senate Democratic Caucus [to resign as Governor] and make an appointment we would be forced to exercise our Constitutional authority under Article I, Section 5, to determine whether such a person should be seated.

The Majority Leader is referring to Article 1, § 5, Clauses 1-2 of the Constitution of the United States, which read:

Section 5. [Clause 1] Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties as each House may provide.

[Clause 2] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

Due to the impeachment proceedings and Blagojevich’s newfound support for a special election, the chances are very good that no one will ever have to answer the question of whether or not Reid actually has the authority not to seat an appointed Senator. On face, this question would appear to be judicial taboo, plainly fitting the parameters for what Federal Judges often call “non-justicable political questions.” But seeing as how it is isn’t very polite to threaten someone with a constitutional power that you don’t have, some people are starting to ask some questions.

In Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486 (1969), the Supreme Court held 8-0 (with Justice Fortas ironically not voting due to his own political scandal) that the House of Representatives did not have the authority to “exclude” a constitutionally-eligible person from serving in Congress. Representative Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) – who brought the case against the Speaker, the House Clerk, the Sergeant at Arms, and even the Doorkeeper of the House – alleged that the House’s decision to exclude him (as made in House Resolutions 1 and 278, both in 1967) was unconstitutional. Powell, who was accused of misusing travel funds and paying his wife an unearned Congressional salary, fit the constitutional requirements for office as stated in Article 1, § 2, Clause 2. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction; the Appeals Court ruled that it did have jurisdiction, but that the matter was, in fact, a non-justicable political question. The Supreme Court accepted review, and heard arguments on April 21, 1969.

In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the Court’s analysis of Article I § 5

demonstrated that in judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution. Respondents concede that Powell met these. Thus, there is no need to remand this case to determine whether he was entitled to be seated in the 90th Congress. Therefore, we hold that, since Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., was duly elected by the voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution, the House was without power to exclude him from its membership.

Thus, it would seem that Harry Reid lacks the authority to refuse to seat a duly-appointed Senator assuming he or she meets the constitutional requirements. The Senate could, of course, vote to expel the member with a 2/3 majority. And it would also be prudent to note that no self-respecting politician would accept a Blagojevich appointment at this point anyway.

In the end, it appears that this a pretty cut-and-dry sort of thing. Harry Reid either misspoke, intending to threaten an expulsion, or else someone needs the Majority Leader of the United States Senate a copy of the Constitution.

With the release today of Altria Group v. Good, the court has left several high-profile cases yet to be decided. Bear in mind that over the last few terms the average number of days between argument and decision has hovered around 90 and, with only 70 days having passed since the start of the term, none of these cases should be considered ‘late.’

Bartlett v. Strickland - Argued on October 14, 2008 (transcript here)- 62 days ago - Bartlett revolves around whether or not a minority group can file suit for vote dilution under certain circumstances.

FCC v. Fox Television Stations Argued on December 4, 2008 (transcript here)- 42 days ago - Fox asks whether or not the use of ‘fleeting expletives’ violates federal regulations against obscene and vulgar language.

Pleasant Grove v. Summum - Argued on December 12, 2008 (transcript here)- 34 days ago -Summum followers asked to place a monument to the ‘Seven Aphorisms‘ be placed near a monument to the Ten Commandments in Pleasant Grove, Utah. See more analysis on the case here.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal - Argued on December 10, 2008 (transcript here)- 5 days ago - Ashcroft asks whether or not a high-level government official can be held liable for supposed mismanagement in crisis.

The Court today handed down an Order’s List (here) that, among other things, granted, vacated and remanded a detainee case and struck down another petition questioning Barack Obama’s qualifications to be President.

In Rasul v. Myers, a group of individuals who had been held in Gutantanamo filed suit claiming inappropriate use of torture and “religious abuse and humiliation.” The DC Circuit handed down an opinion before the Supreme Court handed down Boumediene and today the Court vacated and remanded Rasule in light of its decision in Boumediene. You can see the filings in the case here thanks to SCOTUSblog.

The Court also, as expected, denied application for stay and/or injunction in Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, a case questioning whether or not Barack Obama can correctly be defined as a “natural born citizen” as mentioned in Article II. This marks the third case out of the three filed in which the Court has struck down similar claims.

The Supreme Court handed down an opinion today in Altria Group v. Good (opinion here) which will likely open the door for state-level suits against false advertising by cigarette companies.

Justice Stevens penned the majority opinion and was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion that was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Alito.

In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the cigarette-makers’ claim that federal labeling laws preempted state-level action against the content of those labels. See more of our analysis on the cases here and here.